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Organization administration

What an organization's owners and admins can see and change about the organization itself, from Settings. Each section says who may use it, because the answer differs and the server, not the screen, decides it.

Audit log

Settings › Audit log lists this organization's audit trail, newest first: who acted, what they did, to what, from which address, and when. Each row is written as one sentence, the same sentence the accountability ledger uses, with the raw action name and result beneath it.

Who can open it: organization owners only (org:admin). An admin, member, viewer or billing user gets a 403, and the screen shows that refusal rather than an empty list. A page of the log is a page of every member's IP addresses and browsers, so it is gated the way the SIEM sinks and data-subject requests are. The machine export below is gated more loosely, on read, because a script holding a member's token could already pull it.

Filters:

Filter Matches
Who A member. Also matches what an agent did on that person's behalf.
Action An action name exactly (team.create), or a prefix ending in * (team.*). Any other *, % or _ is refused, not read as a pattern.
Target type, Target id The object acted on, as recorded (project, team, org, …).
From, To Whole days in your time zone. To includes the whole day you pick.
Only actions taken by the deployment operator See below.

Rows the deployment operator wrote. When the people who run this Bucker deployment change something in your organization from their console, two audit rows are written: one in their own organization and one in yours, in your vocabulary (project.ingest.suspended), carrying byDeploymentOperator: true. Those rows are marked By deployment operator here. There is no impersonation: the operator's own name is the actor.

Not plan-gated. The browser works on every plan, Free included, so that those operator rows are always readable. The export is the paid feature.

Reading it is recorded. Every page served writes an audit.browse row (who, which filters, how many rows), after the page is read, so it appears at the top of the next one. The screen only asks for a page when you press Apply filters or Load older records, never in the background.

Download. The Audit-log export card under the list downloads the same rows as JSON Lines for a date range. It needs a paid plan (the auditApi feature).

The API

GET /orgs/:orgSlug/compliance/audit-log
    ?actor=<principalId>&action=<name|prefix*>&targetType=&targetId=
    &from=<ISO>&to=<ISO, exclusive>&operator=true&cursor=&limit=<1..200, default 50>

Answers { entries: [...], nextCursor }, newest first. nextCursor is null once the filter is exhausted; pass it back as cursor with the same filters for the next, older page. Each entry carries actor and onBehalfOf as { principalId, displayName, kind } (displayName is null when the principal no longer exists), outcome (APPROVAL / DECLINE / NEUTRAL, the accountability ledger's classification), the ipAddress, userAgent, metadata and byDeploymentOperator. from must be earlier than to. A malformed cursor is a 400.

For bulk, oldest-first pulls into a SIEM, use GET /orgs/:orgSlug/compliance/audit-log/export (JSON Lines) or a streaming sink instead.

Who acted, and how: the actor fields

Every audit row records, beside the principal, the mode, transport and credential of the act. The server derives them from the credential that was verified; no header, request body or tool argument can set them.

Field Values
actorMode interactive (a person on a session or a personal access token), delegated_client (an OAuth client acting for a person), autonomous (an agent), system (the platform: a worker, a scheduler, an inbound webhook, an organization CI token)
transport dashboard, api, cli, mcp, slack, hook, trigger, playbook, worker
credentialType session, pat, org_token, agent_token, oauth, delegation, service
agentId / oauthClientIdentityId The agent, or the OAuth client identity, behind a non-human act. Exactly one is set on an autonomous or delegated_client row; neither on the others.
clientId, traceId The OAuth client_id from the token, and the W3C trace id the caller sent. Both are correlation, not proof: the trace id is chosen by the client.
intent What the caller said it was doing, up to 500 characters, scrubbed. It is self-reported: an injected agent writes it, so the export labels it selfReported/untrusted and an agent is served it as untrusted data.
before / after The target as it was and became, when each is at most 4 KB; larger values are replaced by beforeDigest / afterDigest in metadata.

A call an OAuth client makes for a person is recorded delegated_client with the client, and the person is still named as the one it acted for; it is never filed as the person's own click.

Read counts

Reads leave no audit row, so reads through the MCP server are counted instead: audit_read_counts holds one row per hour, principal, client, tool and project with the number of calls, rows returned and fields served under the untrusted-data label. It holds counts and no content, is kept for the organization's audit window, and feeds the anomaly detectors: a principal reading ten times its own earlier average is flagged before it writes anything.

SIEM and export format (version 2)

Each line of the audit export and of a streaming sink carries formatVersion: 2. Version 2 only adds fields: everything in version 1 is present and unchanged. The additions are the actor fields above and an ocsf object (OCSF 1.5): class 6003 API Activity for tool calls and API actions, 3004 Entity Management for configuration writes, and 3001 Account Change for grants, tokens and agent lifecycle. A delegation appears as actor.invoked_by, and the four modes are in every record (unmapped.actor_mode). Sinks keep their X-Bucker-Signature; bucker-verify checks a signature, not a schema, and verifies exports from before and after the change.

Owner alerts

An owner can opt in, per action, to be alerted when one of these is written: agent.create, agent.token.create, agent_grant.widen, agent.trust.promote, agent.anomaly.respond, oauth_client.first_seen, oauth_client.enable, org.mcp_client_policy.update, approval_policy.create/update/delete, agent_surface.enable, egress.host.add, connection.credential.set, review_mode.update and review_mode.production_opt_in, in addition to the original security actions.

Teams: the roster and team roles

Settings › Teams › Roster opens a team's detail: everyone on it with their team role and the organization role it sits under, the projects the team is linked to, and the ownership rules that name the team.

Teams decide which projects members below admin can reach, and a team has two roles:

Team role What it adds
Contributor Reads and triages the team's projects.
Team admin Manages the team (rename, members, roles) and administers its projects.

Who can change roles: an organization owner or admin, or that team's own team admin. A contributor cannot promote anyone, themselves included. A team admin can step down, and the change takes effect on their next request, without signing out.

Who can be a team admin: a person whose organization role is Owner, Admin or Member. A Viewer or Billing seat is refused, whether added as team admin or promoted to it: team admin administers projects, which those roles do not allow. Raise the organization role first, in Members. Agents cannot be team admins. The rule holds both ways: lowering a team admin's organization role to Viewer or Billing makes them a contributor on every team they administered, in the same change, and the org.member.role_change audit row lists those teams (teamAdminCappedTeamIds). They stay on the teams. Raising the organization role again does not restore the team role; promote them in the roster.

Tokens: a personal access token can only grant a team role whose permissions it carries itself, so a token cannot create a team admin. Use a signed-in session.

Every change writes a team.member.role_change audit row with the role before and after; adds and removals write team.member.add and team.member.remove.

Owned paths lists only rules on projects you can see yourself; a team you can read does not show you another project's paths.

The API

GET   /orgs/:orgSlug/teams/:teamSlug/members                  any org member
POST  /orgs/:orgSlug/teams/:teamSlug/members                  { userId, role? }  (role defaults to CONTRIBUTOR)
PATCH /orgs/:orgSlug/teams/:teamSlug/members/:principalId     { role: "TEAM_ADMIN" | "CONTRIBUTOR" }
GET   /orgs/:orgSlug/teams/:teamSlug/ownership                rules naming the team, on projects you can read